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A Case of 'Great Unstableness':
A British Slaveholder and Brazilian Abolition
The Historian, vol. 60, no. 4 (Summer 1998)
(forthcoming)
Matt D. Childs
The University of Texas at Austin
The reluctant obedience of distant provinces
generally costs more than it is worth
-Lord Macaulay (1800-1859)

In 1845 the British-owned St. John d'el Rey Mining Company operating in
the Brazilian province of Minas Gerais, reached an agreement with the recently
liquidated Cata Branca Brazilian company to rent 385 slaves for fourteen years.
The contract signed in London detailing the transaction specified that "all of the
said Negroes. . . shall at the end of the said term of fourteen years be and become
absolutely free and emancipated."1 But in 1859, after fourteen years of service,
the St. John d'el Rey Mining Company (hereafter St. John) did not grant the Cata
Branca slaves their duly entitled freedom. The breach of the contract and the
illegal enslavement of over three hundred individuals went unnoticed for nearly
twenty years. The mining company took special precautions to insure that the
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Cata Branca slaves never learned of the freedom clause during the period 1845-59
and especially after the contract had expired. Only in 1879 did the flagrant
violation of the contract by the St. John become known to the general public.
Shortly thereafter, judicial authorities, prompted by Brazilian abolitionists who
rallied around the cause, liberated the slaves.2
The employment of slaves by the British-owned mining company and
their commitment to retaining technically free women, men, and children as
slaves stands in contrast to the general historiography that portrays Great Britain
and the British as staunch proponents of the worldwide anti-slavery crusade. It
was precisely this contradiction that politically weakened and isolated the British
company, coupled with the clear violation of the contract, that made the St. John
vulnerable to the abolitionists' attack to liberate the slaves. The illegal
enslavement of the Cata Branca slaves by the mining company served as an early
catalyst in the Brazilian abolition movement that provided a special opportunity
to launch the anti-slavery campaign in Brazil in 1879. The court case that
brought harsh criticism to the mining company from governments in Britain and
Brazil and united the cause of abolitionism on both sides of the Atlantic has
received the attention of only a few scholars of abolition, and just passing
mention by historians of the St. John.3
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The St. John mining company provides an interesting case of putting a
new perspective on an old topic of abolition historiography: the relationship
between capitalism and slavery. Ever since Eric Williams published his seminal
work Capitalism & Slavery in 1944, the two concepts have figured at the center of
historiographical debates on slavery in the Americas. Williams concluded that
slavery "developed the wealth of Europe. . .[b]ut in doing so it helped to create
the industrial capitalism of the nineteenth century, which turned round and
4

destroyed the power of commercial capitalism, slavery and all its works." Over
the last fifty years scholars have argued over the applicability of Williams'
conclusions emphasizing that political and reform movements played a
significant role in the abolition process and slavery remained a profitable
enterprise during the nineteenth century. The case of the British-owned Saint
John mining company represents a reversal of the forces Williams identified
leading to abolition. Instead of industrial capitalism in Britain representing the
solvent to slavery in the Americas, Brazilian abolitionists attacked a British
industrial enterprise operating in Brazil dependent upon slave labor.5
Until recently scholars challenging the Williams thesis have
predominantly battled over broad macro-economic and political terrain. The
latest generation of scholars examining the abolition process throughout the
Americas have focused on the slaves as central actors in the process leading to
abolition. This trend has produced a crescendo of works in Brazilian
historiography emanating from the centennial of Abolition in 1988. Historians of
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Brazilian slavery have shown how slave resistance contributed to the abolition of
the Atlantic slave trade in 1850, the passage of the Free Womb Law emancipating
children born to slave mothers after 28 September 1871, and the final destruction
of slavery in 1888 through massive flights from plantations in the 1880s. An
examination of the St. John's illegal retention of free men, women, and children
as slaves complements the revisionist Brazilian literature by analyzing how the
political environment of abolition in 1879--shaped by the slaves' own desires and
actions for freedom--provided an ideal opportunity for Brazilian abolitionists to
begin the anti-slavery crusade.6
The St. John began operations in Southeast province of Minas Gerais at the
city of São João d'el Rei in 1830. The board of directors anglicized the spelling of
the city to give their enterprise a name. In 1834 the mining company transferred
their activities to a richer and more profitable lode at the town of Morro Velho,
located 160 miles north across the mountain range. The establishment of the
mine represents part of a larger wave of British investment in Brazil during the
nineteenth century. Although the construction of railways stands out among
British investments, mining remained a lucrative industry despite the passing of
the gold boom in the previous century. The rich lode at Morro Velho continued
to produce a wealth of gold during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. By
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and the Brazilian Law of 1871," Comparative Studies in Society and History 33 (1991): 669-94;
Martha Abreu, "Slave Mothers and Freed Children: Emancipation and Female Space in Debates
on the 'Free Womb' Law, Rio de Janeiro, 1871," Journal of Latin American Studies 28 (1996): 567-80;
Warren Dean, Rio Claro: A Brazilian Plantation System (Stanford, 1976), 124-55; Hebe Maria
Mattos de Castro, Das cores do silêncio: Os significados da liberdade no sudeste escravista, Brasil século
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World War I, Morro Velho had become the deepest mine in the world, and when
mineral extraction ended in 1934, the mine shaft extended 2,453 meters (8,051
feet) below the earth's surface. The depth of the mine corresponded directly to
the wealth of the company. Of all British investments in Latin America during
the nineteenth century, no other company equaled the St. John in average yearly
profits.7
While financial capital and advanced technology, not to mention favorable
geological factors, account for the economic success of the St. John, a productive
labor regime proved equally important in determining net profits. The Annual
Reports of the company from its founding in 1830 through the nineteenth century
contain repeated reference to the difficulty of attracting a steady labor force
resulting from worker resistance to adopting what historian E. P. Thompson has
described as capitalist "time-discipline." Thompson's description of English
"Northern lead-miners who left their work for the harvest" in eighteenth-century
Britain can apply equally to free Brazilians of Minas Gerais in the nineteenth
century.8 In 1844, for example, mine superintendent Charles Herring
complained that "34 native labourers" left their jobs despite the fact that "wages
on the whole had been raised for these people."9 When English traveler Richard
Burton visited the mines twenty years later, the situation had not changed: "The

Book of Abstracts of title deeds for Morro Velho property, 3 Dec. 1834, vol. 1, pp. 24-25,
SJDRMC-BLAC; Bernard A. Hollowood, The Story of Morro Velho (London, 1955), 22; T. A.
Rickard, "The Deepest Mine," Mining and Scientific Press 121 (1920): 477-78; Eakin, British
Enterprise in Brazil, n. 81, 49; Libby, Trabalho escravo, 33.
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free Brazilian showed a decided indisposition to work at Morro Velho" in favor
of "only. . . desultory agriculture."10
Slave labor proved more reliable, and as a result, more profitable. By 1867
the labor force of the mining company had grown to nearly 1,700 slaves, the
majority of those rented from other slaveowners similar to the Cata Branca
slaves. According to historians Amilcar Martins Filho and Roberto B. Martins,
who have studied in detail the demographics of slavery in Minas Gerais, "the
Saint John del Rey may well have been the all-time largest slave-based
enterprise" in the province.11 Scholar Robert Conrad is surely correct in
suggesting that the St. John represented the "largest single British slaveholding
organization in Brazil."12 Because of the difficulty of recruiting a yearly
disciplined free labor force in Minas Gerais, slave labor constituted an essential
ingredient in determining the company's economic success.
Although slavery remained legal in Brazil until the "Golden Law" of 1888
declared abolition, the fact that the St. John was British-owned, with
headquarters in London, provoked considerable controversy with Her Majesty's
government. The British government committed itself to the abolitionist
struggle throughout the nineteenth century. In 1807, the British slave trade was
abolished and in 1833 slavery ended in the British colonies. Great Britain then
focused its abolitionist zeal on other countries of the Americas. In Brazil, the
British navy intercepted slave-trading ships, freed slaves, and even broke off
diplomatic relations over the slave question. While the motivations behind Great
10

Richard F. Burton, Explorations of the Highlands of Brazil, vol. 1 (London, 1869), 267.
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Britain's abolitionist struggle have occupied the attentions of historians as either
humanitarian or imperialist, it is only logical that once Britain outlawed slavery
and the slave trade, it would oppose slave trading and slavery elsewhere to
reduce the advantage competitors derived from cheap labor and to stay true to
the principles the country professed. In 1845, the British Parliament passed the
Aberdeen Act which, in addition to other provisions, prohibited British citizens
from purchasing slaves. The board of directors of the St. John successfully
lobbied Parliament to include a provision that allowed British citizens to
maintain ownership of slaves purchased before the passage of the law and
permitted the renting of slaves from other slaveowners. According to a letter by
the board of directors to Lord Aberdeen, author of the act, "the amount of capital
invested in British mining in Brazil is very large" that would "at once [be]
destroyed" if slaves could not be employed at Morro Velho.13
The clear contradiction between Great Britain's official position on slavery
and the employment of slave labor by the St. John did not go unnoticed in
Britain. In 1848 the British House of Commons and in 1849 the House of Lords
both established Select Committees on the Slave Trade to investigate how Britain
might best suppress the slave trade and slavery. Charles Herring, who served as
superintendent of the mine at Morro Velho from 1830 to 1846, became one of the
first individuals to testify before the House of Lords Select Committee. Herring's
testimony followed a brief statement made by a thirty-one year old slave named
Augstino [sic] who retold the horrors of the middle passage and the arduous
labor at Morro Velho. Herring reported to the Select Committee because of the

Leslie Bethell, The Abolition of the Brazilian Slave Trade: Britain, Brazil and the Slave Trade
Question, 1807-1869 (Cambridge, 1970); Graham, Britain and the Onset of Modernization, 160-86;
Eakin, British Enterprise in Brazil, 33-4; St. John d'el Rey Mining Company to the Earl of Aberdeen,
London, 17 June 1843, Letter Book no. 4, pp. 49-54, SJDRMC-BLAC.
13
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scarcity of free labor in Minas Gerais, slave labor proved more productive since
wage laborers would often leave to work elsewhere or farm their own land.14
Following Herring's testimony, a series of articles in the English press as
diverse as the Daily News, the Mining Journal, the Morning Post, and the AntiSlavery Reporter appeared criticizing the St. John's labor practices. A letter to the
editor of the Daily News on 13 November 1849 summed up British abolitionists'
indignation over the activities at Morro Velho by stating the mining company
represented a "monstrous incongruity of British subjects possessing slaves, hiring
them--in fact purchasing them--when Her Majesty's government is endeavouring
by every means, to abolish slavery!"15 The St. John board of directors responded
by claiming slave labor represented the only option, saying that slaves were
treated "better than the working class of Europe," and "nothing is left undone
that can be done for their good."16 In 1850 the St. John board of directors even
sent an "independent" commission to Morro Velho that wrote a fifty-page
Circular to calm troubled stockholders by assuring them of the "humane and
generous. . . measures already adopted. . . to render them [the slaves] as
contented and happy as men can be expected to be, whose lot is to earn their
bread by the sweat of their brow."17
Great Britain, House of Lords, "Report from the Select Committee of the House of Lords,
Appointed to Consider the Best Means which Great Britain can Adopt for the Final Extinction of
the African Slave Trade," Sessional Papers, 1849-50, Slave Trade, 24 May 1849, pp. 162-71.
14
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Despite the efforts of the British government and abolitionists, the St.
John would not cease their employment of slaves while wage labor remained
scarce in Minas Gerais and slavery legal in Brazil. The protests of the British
abolitionists and government, while ineffective in changing the employment of
slave labor at the mine, did have consequences. A commercial enterprise
operating in a foreign country often relies on the support and backing of its
respective country during times of economic or political difficulties. The
opposition of the government and the abolitionists served to isolate and
debilitate the political influence of the St. John, making it susceptible to the
future action of Brazilian abolitionists over the Cata Branca slaves in 1879.
Although British abolitionists initiated their campaign against the St. John
in 1849, no such activity by Brazil abolitionists occurred until thirty years later.
Minas Gerais, the location of the St. John Morro Velho mine, represented a
province where slavery hung on tenaciously and even expanded in the
nineteenth century. Although there is no general agreement among scholars on
exact population figures, and more importantly, the explanation for the growth
of the slave population and the primary economic activity of slaves, most concur
that Minas Gerais represented the largest slaveholding province in Brazil during
the 1870s-80s. After the abolition of the international slave trade in 1850, there
occurred a significant shift in the slave population as a result of the internal slave
trade from the Northeast to the booming coffee plantations of the Southeast. One
historian has argued that the transfer of hundreds of thousands of workers
resulted in the gradual awakening of antislavery passion at the points of slave
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depopulation while it solidified pro-slavery beliefs at the areas of relocation.
Minas Gerais corresponded to the latter category.18
The pattern of voting in the Chamber and the Senate on the 1871 Law of
the Free Womb emancipating children born to slave women may have reflected
the central support for the slave system in the coffee regions. The slave
population in the three Southeastern provinces of Minas Gerais, Rio de Janeiro,
and São Paulo represented fifty-four percent of the entire slave population in
Brazil in 1872. Minas Gerais, Rio de Janeiro, and São Paulo represented twentyeight of the forty-five votes against the Law of the Free Womb in the Chamber,
and five of seven in the Senate. The province of Minas Gerais, the location of the
St. John mine, opposed the law more strongly than any other; fourteen of the
forty-five votes against the law in the Chamber and three of seven in the Senate
were by representatives from Minas Gerais.19

Luís Anselmo da Fonseca, A escravidão, o clero e o abolicionismo (Bahia, 1887), 18; Joaquim
Nabuco, Minha Formação (1900; reprint, Brasília, 1981), 138-39; Conrad, Destruction of Brazilian
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Brazil, 177; Martins Filho and Martins, "Slavery in a Nonexport Economy," 537-68, and the "Notes
and Comments" by Robert W. Slenes, Warren Dean, Stanley L. Engerman and Eugene D.
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Nineteenth-Century Minas Gerais, Brazil" (Ph.D. diss., Vanderbilt University, 1980); Judy Bieber
Freitas, "Slavery and Social Life: Attempts to Reduce Free People to Slavery in the Sertão
Mineiro, Brazil, 1850-1871," Journal of Latin American Studies 26 (1994): 597-620; Robert Wayne
Slenes. "Os mùltiplos de porcos e diamantes: A economia escrava de Minas Gerais no século xix,"
Estudos econômicos 18 (1988): 449-95; Douglas Cole Libby, Transformação e trabalho em uma economia
escravista: Minas Gerais no século xix (São Paulo, 1988); idem, "Historiografia e a formação social
escravista mineira," Acervo: Revista do arquivo nacional 3 (1988): 7-20; Robert E. Conrad, World of
Sorrow: The African Slave Trade to Brazil (Baton Rouge, 1986), 190-91; José Oiliam, A abolição em
Minas (Belo Horizonte, 1962); Liana Maria Reis, "Escravos e abolicionismo na imprensa mineira
(1850-1888)," Estudos ibero-americanos 26 (1990): 287-98.
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To strike a decisive blow at the institution of slavery, the abolitionists'
movement would have to aim at the geographical heart of the institution: the
Southeast. By 1879, abolitionist speeches and literature had begun to circulate on
a limited scale throughout the country, but anti-slavery feelings rising among the
populace had yet to fully express itself in the form of an organization or catalytic
event. Surrounded by other slaveowners, the St. John's slave practices appeared
secure. The contradiction between Great Britain's policy on the slave trade and
the St. John's labor practices, however, attracted Brazilian abolitionists to the
Cata Branca case. Furthermore, although the British mining company operated
in the center of the slave economy, the vast majority of bondsmen in Minas
Gerais worked in agricultural production. What appeared as strong support for
the slave provinces of the Southeast in the Chamber and the Senate as reflected
in the Law of Free Womb voting, more accurately represented the politicaleconomy of coffee cultivation. In this environment, the discovery of the St.
John's retention of the Cata Branca slaves after they should have been freed
became especially explosive.20
The general public became aware of the St. John's unlawful retention of
the Cata Branca slaves two decades after the contract specified manumission. In
August 1879, Joaquim Nabuco denounced the British mining company in the
Brazilian parliament. The shocking news of a British company denying freedom
to slaves quickly circulated through the press in Brazil, Great Britain, and
elsewhere. In France, the Revue des deux mondes smugly pointed out the
contradiction Nabuco's speech revealed between Great Britain's policy on slavery
and the actions of British citizens in Brazil: "Given the current circumstances,
what is particularly ironic, is that the company, its directors, and stockholders all
20

Conrad, Destruction of Brazilian Slavery, 121-34; Toplin, The Abolition of Slavery in Brazil, 59-61.
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belong to that English nationality which has been so critical of Brazil every time
the question of slavery has been raised!"21 Nabuco, of course, did not by himself
discover the St. John's disregard of the 1845 contract. In a rare moment of poetic
justice, the mining company had itself accidentally attracted the attention of
Brazilian authorities to the illegal enslavement.
In 1871 the Brazilian parliament passed the Law of the Free Womb that
emancipated all children born to slave women after 28 September 1871. In order
to insure compliance with the law, Article 8 required the registration of all slaves
throughout the Empire. Section 2, Article 8 specified: "The slaves who, through
fault or omission of the parties interested, shall not have been registered up to
one year after the closing of the register, shall, de facto, be considered as free."22
The requirement for registering slaves placed the St. John in a precarious
position. If the mining company failed to register the Cata Branca slaves, they
would receive their freedom, and thus, lose several hundred unpaid laborers.
Moreover, if the Cata Branca slaves remained unregistered, and then later earned
their freedom for not being registered, an investigation might have occurred to
determine the owner of the slaves that could have revealed the 1845 contract and
its subsequent violation. The St. John could not claim ownership of the slaves
because the proof, the 1845 contract, clearly stated manumission after 14 years of
service. In 1872 James Gordon, superintendent of the Morro Velho mine,
claiming to represent the Cata Branca Brazilian company, registered the slaves as
belonging to it.23
Speech of Joaquim Nabuco, 26 Aug. 1879, BCCD, Anais, vol. 4, 182-85; Paul Bérenger, "Le Brésil
en 1879," Revue des deux mondes 37 (1880): 441.
21

22

"Lei no. 2040 de 28 de Setembro 1871," Coleção das leis do imperio do Brasil de 1871 31 (1871): 151.

Speech of Ignacio Martins, 26 Aug. 1879, BCCD, Anais, vol. 4, 185; Speech of Joaquim Nabuco,
30 Sept. 1879, BCCD, Anais, vol. 4, 257.
23
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Although unapparent at first, Gordon had seriously miscalculated by
registering the slaves as belonging to the Cata Branca Brazilian company.
Initially, no one seriously questioned his act; the common practice of renting
slaves by the St. John probably countered any suspicion the registry office might
have had as to the veracity of superintendent Gordon's statement. Although
Carlos Rebello Horta, described simply as a "citizen," did report to the judge of
the municipality of Sabará in 1872 that the Cata Branca Company had been
extinct since 1845 and related the stipulation for emancipation in 1859, no action
was taken at this time. Only five years later did legal proceedings against the
mining company begin. In 1879, Joaquim Nabuco exposed superintendent
Gordon's lie by asking the Brazilian parliament how "could it be permitted in this
country to register in 1872 more than 200 persons as slaves belonging to an
extinct company?"24 The Rio News would later explain the inactivity by stating:
"The simple truth is that these authorities resided a little too near the richest gold
mine in Brazil."25
The Rio News correctly pointed out the strong economic and political
influence the St. John exerted over the area surrounding the Morro Velho mine,
but the reasons legal action developed so slowly in defense of the Cata Branca
slaves were more complex. As discussed earlier, abolitionist sentiment had yet to
attract a large following in Brazil by 1872.

Both historians and contemporary

participants tend to concur with Luís Anselmo da Fonseca who wrote in 1887:
"In Brazil the present abolitionist movement began in 1879."26 The Chamber of
Speech of Ignacio Martins, 26 Aug. 1879, BCCD, Anais, vol. 4, 186; Rio News, 5 Sept. 1879, p. 2,
col. 2; Speech of Joaquim Nabuco, 26 Aug. 1879, BCCD, Anais, vol. 4, 184.
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Fonseca, A escravidão, 18; Nabuco, Minha Formação, 138-39; Conrad, Destruction of Brazilian
Slavery, 135; Graham, Britain and the Onset of Modernization, 177.
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Deputies of the Brazilian parliament became the focus of the Brazilian
abolitionists struggle in 1879. The St. John's illegal enslavement of the Cata
Branca slaves played a central role in the opening battle.27
Joaquim Nabuco, eager to make a name for himself and emerge from the
long shadow of his famous father, an elder statesman of the Empire who died in
1878, championed the cause of the Cata Branca slaves in the Brazilian parliament.
Inspired by Bahian Deputy Jeronymo Sodré's anti-slavery speech of 5 March
1879, Nabuco utilized the Chamber's lectern to forward the abolitionist cause
during the legislative session of 1879. Although only a freshman in the Brazilian
parliament, his dramatic and eloquent speeches quickly earned him the respect
of his supporters and the fear of his enemies. Gilberto Freyre did not exaggerate
when he later described Nabuco as a "blazing orator."28 Indeed, Martim
Francisco, who defended the slavery position against Nabuco's attacks in the
Chamber, pleaded with him in October of 1879 "not to put his beautifully erudite
oratorical skills at the service of a cause that could greatly damage our
country."29 According to Nabuco's daughter Carolina, the issue of the Cata
Branca slaves represented Nabuco's first full public commitment to the
abolitionist cause.30
Nabuco's exposure of the St. John's retention of technically free men,
women, and children as slaves on 26 August 1879 elicited a lively response from
the chamber. He quoted from the contract the provisions that detailed the
BCCD, Anais (1879); Carolina Nabuco, The Life of Joaquim Nabuco, trans. Ronald Hilton
(Stanford, 1950), 52-58; Toplin, Abolition of Slavery in Brazil, 60-61.
27
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numbers of slaves sold, the required emancipation in fourteen years, and the
provision that any of the seventy-six children who reached the age of twenty-one
during the time of the contract would receive letters of manumission on their
twenty-first birthday. Nabuco then claimed that the most "vicious" and
"criminal" aspect of the enslavement involved the fact that only 170 of the
original 385 slaves were still alive in 1879. The majority had died as slaves when
they should have lived as freed men and women. He then asked disgustedly:
"Why for twenty years has no action been taken? Why has justice slept for twenty
years? Why has this crime been constantly perpetrated for twenty years?"31
Deputy Ignacio Martins answered Nabuco alleging that the contract "was
completely unknown" in Brazil and claimed he had not known of it despite
residing in the municipality where the mine was located. Deputy Galdino
Emiliano das Neves countered Martins's statement of ignorance by alleging that
"in Minas, everyone knew" of the contract. Martins then craftily defended
himself against any insinuations of complicity by asking Neves if he knew of the
contract, why, "did he not denounce it?" Neves replied that he was no "snitch."
Martins quickly retorted to "snitch in favor of liberty is always honorable."32
Despite the personal conflicts that erupted around the case of the Cata Branca
slaves on the afternoon of 26 August 1879, the Chamber passed a resolution
strongly urging the Minister of Justice to investigate the affair immediately and
relay all information to the legislative body.33
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The St. John responded quickly to the accusations leveled against it in the
legislature and in the subsequent reports in the Brazilian press. On 12 September
1879 a letter from the mining company appeared in the Rio de Janeiro Jornal do
Comercio entitled "The St. John d'el Rey Company to the public." The St. John did
not deny that superintendent Gordon had registered the slaves as belonging to
the Cata Branca company, and acknowledged that he should not have claimed to
represent the Cata Branca company, which he did not. The St. John, however,
emphasized that a new superintendent, Pearson Morrison, had replaced Gordon
in 1876 and could not be held accountable for Gordon's action.34 Nabuco
responded to the distinction between past and present superintendents by
stating:
"The principal responsibility belongs neither to Mr. Gordon nor to Mr.
Morrison for they are employees of the company. . . . The principal
responsibility rests upon those who receive the profits, upon the
shareholders, upon the whole company, which for twenty years has been
enjoying the proprietorship and salaries of over two hundred men."35
In Nabuco's view it did not matter who registered the slaves; what mattered was
why they were not manumitted in 1859.
In the same letter to the public, the mining company stated that the reason
the Cata Branca slaves did not receive their freedom was because the St. John
continued to "pay the salary of the slaves punctually" to the Cata Branca
company.36 Why would the St. John continue to pay an extinct mining company
for the labor of slaves after the contract expired in 1859? The mining company
34
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claimed that the original 1845 contract had been amended in 1857 to extend the
enslavement of the Cata Branca slaves. The St. John turned the 1857 contract
over to judicial authorities investigating the case, and part of it appeared
reprinted in the Rio News on 5 October 1879. The question then became, was the
second contract valid, and did the St. John and the Cata Branca company have
the right to amend the original one.37
In reference to the latter question, the St. John argued the Cata Branca
slaves represented "objects" of both contracts, and not "parties" to it. This created
a legal dilemma. That is, could two "parties" agree to alter the terms of a contract
regarding property even if the "object," as in this case, consisted of human
beings? Slaveowners had the right to alter or abolish contracts for conditional
manumission until the Free Womb Law prohibited revocation in 1871. Despite
the legal authority of masters to revoke conditional manumissions before 1871,
Brazilian courts often favored slaves in manumission suits as a device to police
slaveholder behavior so as to not engender rebellion among slaves. Pedrigão
Malheiro, a respected jurist, publicist, slaveowner, and conservative advocate of
gradual abolition, published an essay in 1867 that sought to define and clarify the
Byzantine legal rights of slaveowners and slaves. Malheiro argued that slaves
were free by natural law, but legal fiction reduced them to slavery. According to
Malheiro, conditional manumission, "once conferred gave the slave the
acquisition of the right to freedom, but delayed or suspended the slave from
exercising that right."38 While the St. John may have had the legal authority to
37
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extend the original contract in 1857, general and legal opinion regarding slavery
had been greatly altered by the redefinition of the relationship between masters
and slaves during the second half of the nineteenth century as a result of the Free
Womb Law. When the illegal retention of the Cata Branca slaves became public
knowledge in 1879, the actions of the St. John represented a violation of the
intent of the Free Womb Law to accommodate slave resistance in order to stave
off widespread rebellion. The Rio News criticized the St. John's claim that it had a
legal right to amend the contract in light of the changing relations between
masters and slaves: "It is difficult to believe that any Englishman would seriously
offer such a defense, even were it justified in law."39
The St. John's defense against the abolitionists boiled down to the 1857
contract. The company's own records, however, call into question the very
existence of a second contract. According to the minutes of the company's board
of directors, only in 1859--not in 1857--did the St. John take any action regarding
possibly extending the 1845 contract. John Dinston Powles, chairman of the St.
John, reported to the board of directors on 18 May 1859 that he had contacted a
Mr. Harding, who represented the Cata Branca company, "in reference to the
agreement for the hiring of the Cata Branca Negroes which will expire on
September next." Powles reported that "he considered that the emancipation of
the Negroes, which had been contemplated to take place at the end of the
agreement was a measure wholly inadvisable, in every point of view, and
particularly with reference to the welfare of the Negroes themselves." Mr.
Harding told Powles that he believed the directors of the Cata Branca company
would "be ready to enter into a fresh agreement for seven years."40 Although the
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board closed the meeting with a resolution to solicit a response from the Cata
Branca company regarding a new contract, surprisingly, there was no further
mention of a contract in the board minutes until 1877.41
The last statement of Chairman Powles, on 18 May 1859, may answer why
the contract was not discussed again in the board minutes for nearly twenty
years. Although Mr. Harding claimed that "it was quite competent for the
directors of the two companies to enter into any fresh agreement," Powles
advised the St. John board of directors to seek "the opinion of counsel as to the
legality of renewing the agreement."42 When the board met on 6 July 1859, the
last entry briefly acknowledged the receipt of counsel's opinion "in reference to
the Cata Branca blacks," but did not state whether or not the lawyer advised in
favor of extending the contract.43 The board adopted no resolution to act upon
the advice provided. The board understood, as it stated in the 18 May 1859
meeting, that the contract expired in September, yet no reference to the Cata
Branca slaves appears in the board minutes again until 7 November 1877.44 If
counsel advised against the legality of a second contract, the board of directors
may have decided not to pursue extending the contract. Instead, the mining
company may have simply ignored the emancipation clause of the 1845 contract.
This conclusion is bolstered by observing the company's willingness to
ignore other clauses of the 1845 contract that did not serve its economic interests.
The 1845 contract specified that "of the said Negroes and children as are now
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under the age of twenty-one years and who shall attain that age during the
subsistence of the agreement shall on their respectively attaining that age be
absolutely free and emancipated."45 The board of directors' deliberate decision
not to free children once they reached the age of twenty-one deserves to be
quoted in its entirety.
The Chairman stated to Mr. Harding that the St. John d'el Rey Company
had never carried into effect that condition in the agreement which provides
for the children of the Negroes being emancipated as soon as they should
attain the age of 21 from an apprehension, in which mine officers at Morro
Velho concurred, that it was a very unsafe proceeding in regard to the
future well being of the young people themselves, who would be exempt
from all control or discipline, at the very time when they required it most.
The directors were further moved by the consideration that there would be
a great unstableness in emancipating children while the parents remained
slaves, and further that it would be an exhibition on the establishment in the
eyes of the Negroes themselves, of something very like a caprice to see one
set of children placed at liberty, while another set remained in bondage.46
If emancipating children once they reached the age of twenty-one represented a
dangerous "exhibition" of freedom, then a massive manumission of hundreds of
slaves could have had apocalyptic implications, not to mention the loss of several
hundred laborers.
An emancipation of hundreds of individuals would surely have disrupted
the St. John's well-developed manumission policy. The mining company
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maintained its power and authority over 1,700 slaves through a manumission
system of rewards based upon good behavior and productivity. English traveler
Richard Burton, who stayed at the Morro Velho mine for several months in 1867
and wrote to chairman Powles that "I have carefully looked into the conditions of
the Blacks and I find that it can hardly by any means be bettered," provides a
brief discussion of the policy in his two volume travel account, Explorations of the
Highlands of Brazil.47 According to Burton, slaves received a special issue of
clothing that they wore on every other Sunday for a ceremony called the Revista
(review). At the Revista, over a thousand slaves lined up in military "columns"
separated by sex in front of the Casa Grande (big house). They received public
recognition from the superintendent and overseers and merit stripes of a "broad
red band" to adorn their Sunday Revista clothing based upon good behavior.
After earning seven merit stripes, the slave received her or his freedom.48 Over
time, control at the mine and disciplining the labor force became increasingly
concentrated in the Revista ceremony that fueled, legitimated, and rewarded
slaves' aspirations of freedom. If the St. John had granted the Cata Branca slaves
their freedom according to the 1845 contract, it would have undermined their
authority and the stability the Sunday Revista manumission policy provided. In
1859, the board clearly stated its opposition to the manumission of the Cata
Branca slaves because the "system of making emancipation the reward of good
conduct . . . was the safe and prudent one, and the only one likely to do any real
good."49
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The absence of conclusive evidence in regard to extending the contract of
the Cata Branca slaves in addition to the board of directors expressing no qualms
about ignoring the emancipatory provision of the 1845 contract for children calls
into question the existence and authenticity of the 1857 contract. Yet, if such a
contract did exist, albeit unrecoverable from the existing documentation, and if
the mining company continued to "pay punctually the salaries of the slaves" to
the Cata Branca company as they claimed in the Jornal do Comercio, we should
expect to find it in their account books.

50

Every year the board of directors

distributed an Annual Report to the stockholders that described the activities of
the company. The balance sheets for the years 1847-58 all contain an entry "Hire
of Cata Branca Negroes" that varies from £3,125 for 1847, £2,500 for the years
1848-53, and £1,500 for the years 1854-58 in accordance with the 1845 contract.51
If the St. John continued to pay the Cata Branca company under a new contract,
we should expect the same entry in the balance sheets to continue to appear.
After 1858, however, the entry disappears. Thus, the clearest proof that a second
contract existed, a financial commitment, does not appear in their records.
Nabuco's denunciation in the Chamber and the reports in the Rio de
Janeiro press brought, judicial, legislative, and popular criticism to mining
activities at Morro Velho, but speeches and sensational reports could not alone
secure the freedom of the Cata Branca slaves. Other factors, although not as
dramatic or press-worthy, but just as important, worked in favor of liberation.
First, the nationality of the company was British. Nabuco could not have
denounced the mining company as effectively and confidently had it been
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Brazilian. Deputies who represented slave provinces and slaveholders' interests
continued to command a strong block within the Chamber on issues relating to
slavery. According to Nabuco, speaking in 1880: "On all matters relative to
freedom we could count on . . . [only] ten votes."52 Had the St. John been
Brazilian, the many deputies who campaigned for slaveholders' interests may
have rallied against Nabuco's attacks. The dissonance between Great Britain's
public support for abolition and the employment of slaves at Morro Velho
provided a rare opportunity for Nabuco and the abolitionists. In a letter to
Charles H. Allen, secretary of the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society,
Nabuco wrote: "The Saint John d'el Rey Mining Company and its accomplices
never had more constant and uncompromising enemies than her Britannic
Majesty's representatives in Brazil. . . . I was rendering a service both to the
English nation and to the Morro Velho slaves."53 The British nationality of the
mining company made them especially vulnerable to the Cata Branca scandal.
Nationalism also worked in an ironic manner. Great Britain pressured
Brazil throughout the nineteenth century to abolish the slave trade and slavery.
In 1863 the conflict between the two countries culminated during William D.
Christie's tenure as British minister in Brazil over the treatment of emancipados-Africans found aboard slave ships, emancipated, and then turned over for a
period of apprenticeship to the Brazilian government or the service of private
individuals--that resulted in the rupture of diplomatic relations. For many
Brazilians, especially slaveowners, abolitionism and British imperialism became
synonymous. As a result, those who championed the anti-slavery cause had to
defend themselves against accusations of being Anglophiles, vile creatures of the
52
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British, and traitors to their country that crippled their ability to campaign
effectively for abolition. In the case of the St. John's retention of the Cata Branca
slaves these allegations did not apply. In fact, the Cata Branca scandal
represented the exact opposite: Brazilian abolitionists attacked a British
slaveholder. Thus, abolitionists could assail the British slaveholder without fear
of being labeled unpatriotic.54
Not only did international politics and nationalism favor the Cata Branca
slaves, but economic factors also contributed to the St. John's vulnerability. The
driving force behind the slave economy in the last decades before abolition was
coffee cultivation. In 1883 when Joaquim Nabuco wrote O Abolicionismo, he
quoted fellow deputy Gaspar Silveira Martins who summed up the slave-coffee
nexus: "Brazil is coffee and coffee is the Negro."55 Although Minas Gerais
represented the most populous slave province in Brazil, deputy Silveira
Martins's dictum did not apply to mining. In their demographic study of
nineteenth-century Minas Gerais, Martins Filho and Martins go so far as to claim
that by the 1870s the "number of slaves employed in mining probably did not
exceed 2,000."56 Recent scholarship has shown the portrait of small-scale
subsistence agriculture drawn by Martins Filho and Martins overlooked how
mining, textile production, and cultivation of foodstuffs for coffee plantations
provided a significant degree of complexity to the Minas Gerais economy.
Nevertheless, the vast majority of slaves worked in agricultural tasks. According
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to Conrad's analysis of the 1872 census, of the 370,459 slaves in Minas Gerais,
278,767 labored as "farm workers."57 Thus, the abolitionists' focus on the St. John
threatened neither the slave system as a whole nor the foundations of the
Brazilian economy as an attack on coffee planters would have done. Nabuco's
speeches, the Brazilian press, external political pressure, nationalism, and
economic factors all conspired against the mining company.
The judicial authority investigating the case at the municipality of Sabará
wasted no time in handing down a decision after the abolitionist press had
created a frenzy of excitement. On 14 October 1879, the district judge Frederico
Augusto Álvares da Silva issued a verdict stating that the Cata Branca slaves
shall "be declared free from the beginning of 1860, and that they be paid the
wages due from . . . 1860 up to the date of" freedom. The verdict paraphrased
Malheiro's opinion on the revocation of conditional manumission by arguing
that the St. John did not have the legal authority to alter the terms of enslavement
because once the 1845 contract had been published and registered, the slaves
"acquired the right to their liberty," and as a result it was "unlawful for the
contracting parties to modify their wishes in a manner prejudicial to the rights
[the Cata Branca slaves had] acquired." Concerning the authenticity of the 1857
contract, the judge did not have access to the internal documentation of the
company described above, but reached the same conclusion. Whereas the first
contract between the St. John and Cata Branca Brazilian company was published
and registered in London, the 1857 contract was ruled "clandestine because it did
not have publicity," and therefore "useless." The judge made sure to point out
the clandestine nature of the contract in his ruling by emphasizing that "as the
Slenes "Os mùltipos de porcos e diamantes," 449-95; Douglas Cole Libby, "ProtoIndustrialisation in a Slave Society: The Case of Minas Gerais," Journal of Latin American Studies
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minister of Her Britannic Majesty asserted, it had no publicity." The judge's
comment indicates that English authorities in Brazil cooperated with the
investigation to liberate the slaves. His ruling concluded that the 1857 contract
"was only drawn up in London on July 21, 1877" in response to the 1877
investigation that "had already been begun on the 11th of June of the same
year."58 The remaining 123 living slaves immediately received their letters of
emancipation.
José Antonio Alonzo de Brito, the chief of police of the province of Minas
Gerais, sent "a sufficient detachment of the police force" to Morro Velho "under
the orders of a military delegate" to liberate the slaves. The show of force likely
had two purposes: first, to make sure the St. John freed the slaves; and second, to
maintain order for fear that the emancipation of 123 slaves might inspire violent
protest among other bondsmen at Morro Velho. The superintendent of the mine,
Pearson Morrison, met the police force and then "gave orders for those who were
to be freed to assemble on the lawn of the Casa Grande." After the Cata Branca
slaves had gathered in front of the superintendent's house, Morrison "read the
order for the execution of the sentence, and the slaves of the Cata Branca
Company [were] declared free."59 Morrison's actions of lining up the Cata
Branca slaves and then reading the declaration of freedom reveals an attempt to
maintain the legitimacy of the Revista ceremony for the others at the mine who
witnessed the liberation of 123 slaves.
The struggle did not end with the verdict. The St. John appealed the
decision. The back wages to the freed slaves represented a huge financial sum of
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£36,640. The mining company, however, did not have much bargaining power.
Not only did the Cata Branca scandal weaken the St. John politically, but the
Brazilian government in 1878 placed a four percent tax on all profits derived
from gold in Minas Gerais. In the fall of 1879, the board of directors decided "in
consideration of the many important questions now pending forth at Rio de
Janeiro and Morro Velho whether the time had not arrived for another visit by a
member of the board."60 Shortly thereafter, board member Frederick Tendron
traveled to Brazil in 1880 to investigate the Cata Branca case and lobby the
Brazilian parliament to have the tax revoked.61
While the primary purpose of Tendron's trip was to appeal the four
percent tax, the Cata Branca scandal severely impaired his mission. The British
Foreign Office refused to aid the St. John in repealing the gold tax. Lord
Salisbury summed up the views of the Foreign Office in no uncertain terms when
he wrote to the company declaring "the protection of Her Majesty's legation
cannot properly be extended to a British Co. whose proceedings have been . . .
declared to be in violation of the Slave Trade Acts."62 Tendron complained that
the company had to lobby the Brazilian parliament by themselves "without any
support from our side" because of the Cata Branca case.63 Even before landing in
Brazil, Tendron reported in a letter marked "private," so as to not have it read at
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the board meetings as was customary, that he was "violently. . . assailed . . . on
the subject of the Cata Branca blacks" by a merchant on the ship to Rio de
Janeiro.64 The negative publicity surrounding the illegal enslavement in Rio,
prompted Tendron to visit Mr. Seally of the Anglo-Brazilian Times to counter the
reports in the Rio News. He even offered to "meet the English residents and
explain" the situation personally.65 When Tendron called upon members of the
Brazilian parliament who had supported the mining company in the past, they
proved unwilling to lend assistance because of the Cata Branca scandal. The
board of directors had originally decided to tell members of the Chamber that
they would refuse to pay the tax, but according to Tendron, the plan changed
because "I could not allow an impression to spread that the Board were afraid to
enforce their orders [the 4 percent tax] because of the Cata Branca Scandal."66
Tendron's efforts to appeal the decision that granted the Cata Branca
slaves their back wages fared no better than his attempt to repeal the four
percent tax. He could not build a case for appeal and lobby for the revoking of
the four percent tax at the same time. The superintendent of the Morro Velho
mine, Pearson Morrison, apparently concluding defeat on the slavery issue,
requested that Tendron no longer take "any step in connection with Cata Branca"
and work "solely with the provincial tax."67 In October of 1881, the Supreme
Court upheld the lower court's decision that granted the Cata Branca slaves their
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freedom and back wages. On 21 October 1881, the board of directors gathered
for a "special" meeting to discuss the telegram sent by superintendent Morrison
informing them of the Supreme Court's decision. The Chairman, Hockin, then
sent a telegram to Morrison that stated the "Board must rely altogether on your
judgement . . . you are at liberty to compromise a sum."68
Did the St. John pay the Cata Branca slaves their back wages? The past
conduct of the company warrants skepticism. The board minutes, Annual
Reports, and other company sources provide no evidence of compliance. The St.
John even decided not to inform stockholders about the verdict. They had to
address the Cata Branca case, however, because the British and Foreign Antislavery Society continued to print stories about events at Morro Velho in the
Anti-Slavery Reporter.69 In a pamphlet entitled Memorandum by the Company dated
November, 1881, the St. John repeated their justifications for not freeing the Cata
Branca slaves because the 1857 contract extended the enslavement and argued
manumission "would be very injurious to the true welfare of the slaves
themselves."70 The Annual Report distributed at the 1882 stockholder meeting,
notwithstanding receipt of Morrison's telegram to the contrary, stated "no
decision has yet been arrived at with regard to the case pending before the
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Supreme Court of Appeal at Rio."71 After 1882, there is no further mention of the
Cata Branca slaves in St. John sources and no indication of the payment of back
wages.
If the Cata Branca slaves did not receive their back wages, would not the
abolitionists who championed their cause in 1879 have voiced opposition?
Abolitionists, both in Britain and Brazil, continued to focus their attention on the
employment of slave labor at Morro Velho, but no reference appears in regard to
back wages from abolitionist sources either. Nabuco regularly corresponded
with the British and Foreign Anti-slavery Society who, in turn, had members of
the House of Commons pressure the St. John to release the remaining (non Cata
Branca) slaves held at Morro Velho. The abolitionists' focus on liberating the
other slaves held by the mining company did not end their interest in the Cata
Branca case. Following the October 1881 decision, Nabuco wrote to the British
and Foreign Anti-slavery Society to inform them of the verdict. Charles H. Allen,
Secretary of the British and Foreign Anti-slavery Society, responded to Nabuco's
letter in November by thanking him for his "kind interest and assistance in the
matter," and acknowledging receipt of the Supreme Court's decision.72 Because
we could logically expect the abolitionists to protest if the St. John did not
compensate the ex-slaves for back wages, we could possibly assume some form
of payment was made that simply did not appear in the Annual Reports for fear
that it might have caused stockholders to withdraw their shares. Or, the lack of
desire by the abolitionists to have freed slaves monetarily compensated for their
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illegal enslavement, in contrast with their enthusiasm to see them emancipated,
pointedly reveals the socio-economic limitations of the abolition movement at its
very beginning. Post-emancipation Brazil would witness government subsidies
to aid European migrants while ex-slaves would receive no financial equivalents.
The questions if payment was made, how much, and over what period of time
remains elusive from the available documentation.73
The 1881 Supreme Court decision ended the history of the illegal
enslavement of the Cata Branca slaves. Tragically, for twenty years several
hundred individuals remained enslaved in the pursuit of profits for a British
mining company. "Unhappily and far more lamentable," Nabuco later wrote,
"out of 38[5] slaves, who in 1845, obtained a perfect right by a legal title to their
liberty . . . only 123 appeared to receive their letters of freedom from the hands of
public justice."74 Those who died, however, did not die in vain. The massive
emancipation the board feared that would "create serious dissatisfaction, if not
insurrectionary movements among the slaves in the neighbourhood" did
undermine their "good-behaviour" gradual manumission policy, albeit twenty
years later.75 The liberation of 123 slaves, in "the eyes of the Negroes
themselves," hastened the demise of slavery at Morro Velho by undermining the
company's manumission policy that served to maintain order and act as a
conserving force over a large slave population.76 The case attracted world
attention and condemnation to the activities of Her Majesty's subjects in Minas
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Gerais. As a result, the St. John, which held as many as 1,700 individuals in
bondage in 1867 and possibly represented the largest slaveholder in the most
populous slave province in Brazil, liberated the remaining slaves who worked its
gold mines in 1882. In this case, the scandal created over the illegal enslavement,
functioned to liberate all of the slaves al Morro Velho.77
Although a sensational court case dramatically contributed to the end of
slavery at Morro Velho, St. John sources are noticeably silent on any significant
changes in mining operations as a result of the transition to wage labor.
Stockholders continued to receive dividend checks from the company and
mineral extraction from the mine showed no conspicuous irregularities after
emancipation.

Apparently, enough freed slaves continued to work and live at

the mine, where they had developed their own sense of community, that the
mining company did not suffer a debilitating labor crisis. To compensate for the
freed slaves who did choose to leave the mine and find a new employer, board
member Frederick Tendron recruited Canadian, Italian, and Chinese miners but
found that "the Cata Branca business. . . unsettled" laborers and prevented some
from signing on.78 The significant changes that did occur at Morro Velho in the
1880s did not reflect the end of slavery, but rather, the mine collapse on 10
November 1886 that paralyzed production for nearly ten years.79
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The significance of the Cata Branca case did not remain limited to Morro
Velho alone. According to historian Robert Conrad, 1879 represented the
beginning of "uncompromising abolitionism" and the advent of "a new and more
powerful antislavery movement."80 The Cata Branca case served as an important
cause célèbre for the Brazilian abolitionist movement. Brazilian abolitionists
easily coalesced around the case because it involved a British slaveholder, a
politically weak and isolated enterprise, leant itself to the invocation of
nationalism, the economics of the mining sector, and exposed a flagrant violation
of a contract. All of the aforementioned characteristics would not have applied to
a coffee cultivator or other Brazilian slaveholders. Thus, the case offered a
special opportunity to forge the abolitionists' cause and put into action what
many believed.
The event quickly earned Joaquim Nabuco and the abolitionists
recognition as a new and powerful force in Brazilian politics. The case had such
importance to abolitionists that the credit for freeing the Cata Branca slaves
became disputed in the Rio News. On 7 September 1880, the day of Brazilian
independence, the Sociedade Brasileira Contra a Escravidão (Brazilian AntiSlavery Society) formed at Nabuco's house. In November of that year, the
organization began publishing O Abolicionista to "fight slavery" and show "that
slave labor was the only cause for the industrial and economic backwardness of
[Brazil]."81 The formation of the society coincided with the emergence of popular
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anti-slavery sentiment and the appearance of abolitionist clubs that swept the
country inaugurating the dominant theme of Brazilian politics until the 1888
"Golden Law" declared abolition. While Great Britain deserves recognition as a
precursor worldwide in championing the abolitionist cause, and Brazil is no
exception, a national scandal involving a British mining company that illegally
held free men, women, and children as slaves for twenty years ironically
represents one of the first victories of the Brazilian anti-slavery crusade that
served as an important catalyst in mobilizing a wider public behind the overall
abolition movement.82
It is the public scandal that offends;
to sin in secret is no sin at all.
-Molière (1622-1673)
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